

Teaching Current Directions in Psychological Science

Aimed at integrating cutting-edge psychological science into the classroom, Teaching Current Directions in Psychological Science offers advice and how-to guidance about teaching a particular area of research or topic in psychological science that has been the focus of an article in the APS journal Current Directions in Psychological Science. Current Directions is a peer-reviewed bimonthly journal featuring reviews by leading experts covering all of scientific psychology and its applications and allowing readers to stay apprised of important developments across subfields beyond their areas of expertise. Its articles are written to be accessible to nonexperts, making them ideally suited for use in the classroom.

Correcting Our Stereotype of Stereotypes

by David G. Myers

[Jussim, L., Crawford, J. T., & Rubinstein, R. S. \(2015\). Stereotype \(in\)accuracy in perception of groups and individuals. *Current Directions in Psychological Science*, 24, 490–497.](#)

Among psychology's familiar lessons are:

Stereotypes are prejudice-supporting *misperceptions of groups*. They are biased beliefs, albeit sometimes exaggerations of “kernels of truth” (Allport, 1954).

As cross-cultural psychologists have repeatedly shown, *groups differ*. We humans are multicultural and should not hesitate to embrace our identities and affirm and respect our differences.

Humans are *natural social psychologists*. We observe and infer. Our ancestors survived by becoming reasonably accurate observers. They discerned what a facial expression predicts and whether to regard another group as friend or foe.

But consider: If the second and third lessons are valid, then might not our beliefs about groups — our stereotypes — often be accurate rather than biased? Such is the contrarian idea articulated by Yueh-Ting Lee, APS Fellow Lee Jussim, and Clark McCauley (1995) in their edited volume, *Stereotype Accuracy: Toward Appreciating Group Differences*, now updated in this concise, thought-provoking essay by Jussim, Jarret Crawford, and Rachel Rubinstein (2015).

To introduce the reality of group differences, instructors could offer data from three domains for which we have both panhuman and cultural data:

- *Worldwide life expectancy* is 71 years but varies from 46 years in Sierra Leone to 84 years in Japan (World Health Organization, 2015).
- *Worldwide obesity* is 37% but varies from 3% in Timor-Leste to 85% in Tonga (Ng, 2014).

- *Worldwide religiosity* is 68% (those who agree that “Religion is important in my daily life”) but varies from 16% in Estonia to 100% in Niger (Diener, Tay, & Myers, 2011).

Ergo, we humans are kin beneath the skin. But how we differ!

To introduce stereotyping, instructors might ask students to write down two things that come immediately to mind when thinking about these (or other) groups: *Japanese, football players, women, librarians*. Likely, they will have impressions of what’s distinctive about these groups — impressions that may or may not be accurate.

Measuring Stereotype Accuracy

So how might we assess the accuracy of stereotypes — of, say, a belief that men are taller on average, or more (or less) aggressive or socially connected, than women? In two ways, note Jussim, Crawford, and Rubinstein:

Discrepancy scores compare perceivers’ stereotypes to a criterion, such as census data from different groups. For example, do people overestimate, underestimate, or accurately estimate the average male–female height difference?

Correspondence scores record the correlation between perceptions and criteria. Mindful of meta-analysis criteria for medium and large effects, Jussim et al. consider correlations below .25 as inaccurate, those of .40 and above as accurate, and those in between as moderately accurate.

Their bottom-line conclusion: “Stereotype accuracy is one of the largest and most replicable findings in all of social psychology.” Although stereotypes are far from perfect, “accuracy dominates bias” (Jussim, 2012).

Variations in Stereotype Accuracy

But some stereotypes are more accurate than others. Widely shared perceptions of race and gender differences in wealth, education, and other characteristics tend to be “highly accurate,” conclude Jussim and colleagues. That’s especially so among educated people, who seemingly have greater knowledge of group differences. Moreover, when people are inaccurate, Jussim and colleagues provocatively add, the stereotypes they hold tend most often to *underestimate* actual group differences.

On the other hand, widely shared stereotypes of national character traits (e.g., which countries have the most agreeable or conscientious people) have generally *not* been confirmed by Big Five trait assessments from various countries. So stereotypes can err. And stereotypes can feed polarization. Americans — especially extreme political partisans — have exaggerated views of their opponents’ actual positions and moral values. Liberals and conservatives differ, but not by as much as they suppose.

Both 20th- and 21st-century history offer many examples of prejudicial stereotype exaggerations: Nazi stereotypes of sinister Jews, racist stereotypes of African American welfare abusers, and fear-fueled stereotypes of Muslim immigrants as potential terrorists. Hatemongers spread pernicious stereotypes. And illusory correlations (inaccurate stereotypes) also can arise from the vivid juxtaposition of two comparatively infrequent categories (such as terrorist acts and American Muslims).

Do People Use Stereotypes When Judging Individuals?

When a stereotype is highly diagnostic and we lack information about someone's personal characteristics, then reasonable people may apply their stereotypes. If "George" is known to be a football player, we may — knowing nothing more — infer that George is probably muscular, or perhaps a "dumb jock." But when individuating information is available (when we can look at and talk to George and judge for ourselves), then people generally use that information, ignoring their stereotypes.

To demonstrate that stereotypes generally do not entice people to ignore salient individual differences, Jussim will invite a very different-looking student of his gender to stand next to him. He then asks:

"Are we male or female?" (Everyone agrees they are both male.)

"Do people hold stereotypes about males and females?" (Again, students agree, yes.)

"Can you nevertheless see differences between us?" (Students laugh, acknowledging that any gender stereotypes do not preclude their seeing individuals for who they are.)

To further demonstrate that a stereotype can be valid even when some individuals do not fit it, Jussim suggests asking students, "Which is warmer, New Jersey or Alaska?" or "Which is colder, New Jersey or California?" He picks an example that allows noting (in this instance) an Alaskan city that is currently warmer than his own New Jersey town, or a California city that is colder. "So, is the generalization that Alaska is colder inaccurate?" (No.) "Why not?" (Because generalizations don't apply to all individual cases, and generalizations can never be assessed by individual anecdotes.)

Finally, instructors might reflect on and discuss our definitions of "stereotype" and "prejudice." Are stereotypes, as Jussim et al. and other social psychologists suggest, "beliefs about groups"? Or is a stereotype, as the *Oxford English Dictionary* says, a "fixed and oversimplified" idea?

In other words, is a stereotype a *generalized belief* about others (often accurate, but sometimes inaccurate), or is it (as implied by the 18th- and 19th-century metal "stereotype plates" cast for printing identical images) an *overgeneralized* idea that overestimates the similarity of out-group members (while recognizing the differences among people in one's own group)? (Jussim et al. note that if we were to define stereotypes as inaccurate or overgeneralized social beliefs, then no belief could be a stereotype until shown to be inaccurate. Note also that neither of these definitions implies *essentialism* — the presumption that racial or gender group differences are inherent and immutable.)

Instructors also could note that even accurate stereotypes may predispose prejudice, as when dominant group members attribute real group differences to presumed deficiencies, such as laziness or irresponsibility.

Conclusions

So what can we say about stereotypes? They are, if defined as generalized beliefs about social groups, often accurate and sometimes inaccurate, but are not inaccurate simply by virtue of being generalizations. The presumption that all stereotypes are inaccurate is, ironically, an inaccurate stereotype.

These data also speak to a widespread concern that social psychology is inherently liberal. Although social psychologists *are* mostly political liberals (Haidt, 2016), psychological science at its best checks its own biases against reality (Duarte et al., 2014). In response to attacks on their findings of faculty preferences for female candidates, Past APS Board Member Stephen Ceci and APS Fellow Wendy Williams (2015) reported that “Our guiding principle has been to follow the data where it takes us.” In their research, as in these stereotype-accuracy studies, liberal assumptions (of rampant sexism and ubiquitous exaggerated stereotypes) have, the researchers argue, crashed against a wall of data.

In other cases, liberal assumptions fare better. Many data have affirmed progressive assumptions concerning the dynamics of prejudice and the social toxicity of economic inequality (Pickett & Wilkinson, 2011).

Ergo, it’s neither conservative nor liberal for psychologists to follow the data, and for psychology’s researchers and teachers to give the data a voice. Evidence-based psychological science at its best is humane, compassionate, and courageous in its pursuit of truth.